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Intersectionality is an analytic tool for studying and challenging complex social inequalities at the nexus
of multiple systems of oppression and privilege, including race, gender, sexuality, social class, nation,
age, religion, and ability. Although the term has become widely used in psychology, debates continue
and confusion persists about what intersectionality actually is and how best to take an intersectional
approach to psychological science. This special issue of Translational Issues in Psychological Science on
intersectionality includes a range of methodological tools and theoretical perspectives that advance
psychological research on intersectionality. In particular, these projects constitute psychological
research that takes intersectionality’s political aspirations seriously and envisions psychology as a tool
for social justice. The articles model responsible use of intersectionality through citation practices that

reflect intersectionality’s origins in Black feminist thought and women of color scholar-activism, as well
as through analyses that reflect intersectionality’s commitment to reflexivity, structural critique, and
complexity. In this introduction, the editors reflect on intersectionality’s challenge to psychology and
consider the place of translational science amid global crises and what critical psychologist Michelle
Fine calls “revolting times.”

What is the significance of this article for the general public?

This paper introduces a special issue on the topic of intersectionality and situates this social justiceoriented scholarship in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the racial justice uprisings of 2020, and
ongoing debates about psychologists’ role in addressing social problems.
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“The virus does not discriminate.”
Throughout the global crisis sparked by the novel coronavirus pandemic, a common refrain among
journalists and public health officials is that the virus is opportunistic and nondiscriminatory (e.g., Prior,
2020). In other words, the virus that causes the deadly disease called COVID-19 will infect whomever it
can infect without prejudice.
The virus does not discriminate. And yet the global pandemic is inextricable from the systemic
inequalities it has laid bare throughout the planet and particularly in contexts of profound social and
economic stratification, such as the United States. That the virus itself does not discriminate seems a
moot point when in fact the virus has disproportionately affected those most vulnerable to
discrimination, violence, and health inequalities. In the United States, Black, Latinx, and Indigenous
individuals are far more likely to contract the disease and to die from it than their White counterparts
(Oppel et al., 2020). Emerging research suggests Black people are three times more likely to become
infected and twice as likely to die from COVID-19 than White people; meanwhile, both Latinx and Black
people are more than four times as likely than White people to require hospitalization after
contracting the disease (Neuman, 2020).
The gendered dimensions of frontline labor (i.e., health care) and the economy more broadly mean
that women and men encounter different vulnerabilities to the disease in diverse risk contexts. While
large numbers of White middle- and upper-income people can work from home during the recession
caused by the pandemic, the overrepresentation of Latinx women in domestic, hospitality, leisure, and
service-based indoor labor has resulted in greater rates of unemployment relative to Latinx men, as
well as White women and White men (Gould et al., 2020). Meanwhile, Black workers have faced
greater health insecurities in frontline occupations deemed essential, sometimes with minimal
strategies to mitigate viral transmission (Gould et al., 2020). U.S. President Donald J. Trump and White
House officials regularly refer to the virus, SARS-CoV-2, as the “Chinese virus,” the “virus from China,”
or more explicit racial slurs (Vazquez, 2020), while Asian Americans have reported an alarming rise in
discrimination and racist interpersonal and physical violence (Anti-Defamation League, 2020). Sexual

and gender minorities, who already face social isolation and structural stigma—including its attendant
health effects (Hatzenbuehler, 2016)—now confront the psychological consequences of social and
physical distancing. Compounding these stressors are the heightened dangers of the disease for
individuals living with HIV and compromised immune systems. Because the preexisting health
conditions that appear to make COVID-19 more deadly are unevenly distributed across the U.S.
population and are overrepresented among racial and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, sexual
and gender minorities, and poor and working-class individuals, the epidemiological landscape of the
novel coronavirus is similarly imbalanced (Oppel et al., 2020).
That the virus does not discriminate is a mundane scientific observation with almost no substantive
consequence for how COVID-19 has devastated lives and reshaped our social worlds. In order to begin
to adequately understand and combat the pervasive, and inevitably long-term social and psychological
consequences of the global pandemic, social and behavioral scientists need frameworks and methods
equipped to capture the complexity of the novel coronavirus’s wrath. Prevention, mitigation, and
recovery efforts must be sufficiently attuned to the intersections of inequality that existed before
COVID-19 and will persist in its wake.
Although we conceptualized this issue on intersectionality in psychology almost a year before the novel
coronavirus became the greatest global health crisis since the 1918 influenza pandemic, the current
pandemic has underscored the urgency of intersectionality and of applied, translational science. Barely
legible to most psychologists only 15 years ago, intersectionality has moved from the margins to the
mainstream of psychological research on inequalities. Psychologists’ enthusiasm for intersectionality is
evidenced by widely cited papers (Bowleg, 2008; Cole, 2009), special issues and collections (Parent et
al., 2013; Santos & Toomey, 2018; Shields, 2008), forums and special sections (Else-Quest & Hyde,
2016; Grzanka et al., 2017), and the appearance of intersectional discourse across the discipline
(Moradi et al., 2020)—not just in feminist and multicultural psychology. And while guidelines for best
practices (Lewis & Grzanka, 2016; Warner, 2008) and responsible implementation of intersectionality
research (Cole, 2009; Moradi & Grzanka, 2017) have circulated since intersectionality became a
buzzword in psychology (Grzanka, 2020), extensive debates about proper usage of intersectional
approaches persist (e.g., Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016; Syed, 2010). Some have observed that the uptake of
intersectionality in psychology is largely rhetorical and superficial: a way of describing multiple social
identities without attending to the coconstitution of oppressive social forces or conducting research
without taking seriously the social justice politics and epistemic assumptions undergirding
intersectionality (Shin et al., 2017). Others have focused on issues of measurement (Lewis & Neville,
2015; Scheim & Bauer, 2019), suggesting that intersectional scales and psychometric tools are best
equipped to assess intersectional empirical phenomena. And others have argued for fundamental
reconceptualization of key psychological constructs and tenets by insisting that intersectionality’s
challenge to psychology is far greater than a methodological or statistical problem (Rosenthal,
2016; Warner et al., 2016).
These ongoing debates about intersectionality in psychology have garnered significant attention
(e.g., Warner et al., 2010) and at least partially motivated the editors of Translational Issues in
Psychological Science to devote an entire issue to the topic for the first time in the journal’s history.
Another equally important impetus for the special issue is the potential for intersectionality-informed

work to enhance the translational capacity of psychological science. Indeed, intersectionality is
fundamentally translational—although most of intersectionality’s inaugurators in Black feminist and
women of color activism in the 19th and 20th centuries would likely not have characterized it that way
(May, 2015). For women such as Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells, Anna Julia Cooper, and Maria Stewart,
the fight for justice for U.S. Black women and similarly situated groups worldwide was a necessity
(Collins, 1990/2000), not an optional approach or implications section in a psychological article. The
intersectional nature of Black feminist thought reflects U.S. Black women’s lived experiences at the
nexus of oppressions and is inseparable from Black women’s resistance movements; Collins
(1990/2000) characterized this relationship between resistance and oppression as dialectic and echoed
her earlier theorization (Collins, 1986) of Black women’s standpoint as one of the “outsider within.” A
key contribution of Black feminist theorizations of intersectionality is the idea that lived experiences
of marginalization and violence are a powerful source of knowledge and social action. Just as
knowledge can enact harm (Foucault, 1972), intersectionality’s foremothers showed how knowledge
can function as a form of social justice by exposing injustice, identifying and explaining social problems,
and uniting groups across differences in solidarity against oppression (May, 2015).
If the phrase “translational issues in psychological science” suggests that some science has
translational value, an intersectional approach to scientific inquiry would put translation at the
conceptual center. Reconfiguring scientific values in this way does not minimize the importance of
validity, reliability, or reproducibility, but yokes with these priorities a commitment to knowledge that
enhances well-being and equity for all, especially those affected by systemic inequalities. For
example, Grzanka et al. (2017) operationalized intersectionality as “the study and critique of how
multiple social systems intersect to produce and sustain complex inequalities” (p. 453) and emphasized
the critical, justice focus of intersectionality as much as its analytical, empirical rigor. One of the
reasons intersectionality has fascinated and perplexed so many psychologists is because it is not a
scientific theory and yet has proven to be a powerful tool for conceptualizing oppression and privilege,
as well as for challenging systemic inequality through research (Cole, 2009; Rosenthal, 2016), teaching
(Case, 2017), practice (Adames et al., 2018), and advocacy (Hage et al., 2020).
Intersectionality the term appeared in academic writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s when critical
race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) and sociologist Patricia Hill Collins
(1990/2000) published landmark texts that introduced intersectionality as a radical critique of
institutional violence. They argued that institutions including law, politics, and education erase the
experiences of women of color and produce unique forms of discrimination and harm that affect, in
particular, African American women in ways that are distinct from anti-Black racism toward African
American men and sexist discrimination toward White women. Further, intersectionality offered a
critique of antiracist and feminist social movements that reproduce such structural violence through
“single-axis” political strategies that deny the complexity of oppression for women of color who face
racism, sexism, and class discrimination, for example, as well thoroughly unique forms of inequality
(e.g., gendered racism) that cannot be reduced to or derived from the experiences of prototypical
Black men and White women. Further, these early texts by Crenshaw and Collins introduced key
concepts in intersectionality studies, including the matrix of domination and Crenshaw’s typology of
the structural, political, and representational dimensions of oppression.

It is now widely recognized that intersectionality’s intellectual history far predates academics’ interest
in the concept. Before it was called “intersectionality,” the ideas represented by the term had been a
foundational element of U.S. Black women and women of color political organizing and coalition
building (Cole, 2008; May, 2015). Collins and Bilge (2020) characterize intersectionality as an analytic
tool comprising the following core ideas: social inequality, intersecting power relations, social context,
relationality, social justice, and complexity (p. 31). Similarly, Collins (1990/2000, 2019) has consistently
positioned intersectionality as a critical social theory—a framework for understanding injustice and
promoting social justice—rather than a politically agnostic scientific or testable theory. Although one
can trace a conceptual line from these early texts to enthusiastic uptake of intersectionality in
psychology during the first decade of the 20th century (Moradi et al., 2020), it is likewise important to
note that feminist and multicultural psychologists have been engaging intersectional themes and
drawing on women of color feminisms to do so for generations (Grzanka, 2018). Path-breaking
psychologists, including Oliva Espín (1993); Aída Hurtado (1989), and Michelle Fine (1992), for example,
have been advancing intersectional ideas (e.g., standpoint) and methods (e.g., critical
participatory action research) for decades and have inspired new generations of scholars who are
imagining novel ways to harness psychological science as a tool for collective liberation and social
justice.

The Contributions in the Special Issue

The articles in this issue collectively represent how intersectionality can animate translational science
in psychology. Through a range of empirical and conceptual articles, including experimental,
quantitative, and qualitative research from across the discipline, these articles link psychological
inquiry to applied social issues by way of intersectionality. As an editorial collective, we evaluated
submissions based on the extent to which they represented “strong” versus “weak” approaches to
intersectionality, which Dill and Kohlman (2012) distinguished as approaches that merely examine
multiple dimensions of social identity (i.e., weak) versus those that consider social systems in relation
to each other. Further, we considered how each article takes social justice concerns and potential
applications of findings to be more than “implications”; in this sense, we followed Shin et al.’s
(2017) extension of Dill and Kohlman’s framework to prioritize articles that could be characterized as
“transformative” insomuch as they argue for or make systems-level interventions. Notably, the articles
included in this special issue are far less about debating the meaning and uses of intersectionality than
they are about demonstrating its analytic contributions to psychological science. Their work represents
responsible use of intersectionality (Moradi & Grzanka, 2017) through citation practices that link
intersectionality’s contemporary applications to its origins in women of color theorizing and activism,
careful consideration of how oppression and privilege manifest simultaneously in ways that are
relational and complex, and thoughtful foregrounding of the structural and political dimensions of
inequality rather than a fixation on identities as the end point of intersectional analysis and critique.
Finally, while several of the authors demonstrate intersectionality’s potential applications in various
sites of inquiry and with diverse populations, three of the seven articles (Brassel, Davis, et al.,
2020; Coles & Pasek, 2020; Kilgore et al., 2020) focus on Black women specifically.
Albuja et al. (2020) extend current thinking on intersectionality by examining how belonging to
multiple minority categories within a single system (e.g., race) can create unique experiences

of marginalization. The authors draw attention to the identity experiences of dual-minority biracial
people, particularly the extent to which being told to identify differently or being asked about
one’s racial identity may be uniquely stressful for biracial individuals who cannot claim a high-status
White identity. They take intersectionality’s focus on interlocking systems of oppression to explore
how multiple experiences of racialization may produce “intra-race intersectionality” for dual-minority
biracial individuals. The results demonstrate the need for greater consideration in theory and research
of the positionality, experiences, and meaning making of individuals with multiple identities within a
given social category (i.e., race). Directly responding to Cole’s (2009) question “Who is included in this
category?”, their important extension of current thinking on intersectionality has implications for how
individuals are grouped and studied by their race and ethnicity, as well as what psychologists count as
intersectional.
Drawing on methods traditionally underrepresented in psychology, Singh and Bullock (2020) use
feminist discourse analysis to examine mainstream newspaper coverage of the 2013 reauthorization of
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), especially with respect to race, class, and gender. Their work
hearkens to some of the most classic writing on intersectionality, namely, Crenshaw’s (1991) landmark
analysis of the limitations of domestic violence prevention and intervention to acknowledge and
attend to the experiences of women of color. Singh and Bullock (2020) found that news articles
represented law enforcement as the primary and preferred intervention for domestic and sexual
violence, whereas systemic interventions were given more limited coverage. Additionally, they found
that contextual and intersectional factors related to sexual and domestic violence (e.g., racism,
sexism, heterosexism) were given only superficial coverage. By focusing on media coverage of VAWA,
Singh and Bullock highlight the prevalence of nonintersectional, single-axis framings of violence against
women in public discourse, as well as the potential problematic intervention strategies that may be
associated with these limited conceptualizations. Without understanding violence against women
through an intersectional lens, one can run the risk of misunderstanding or even harming survivors.
Although the authors focus on mainstream news coverage, their work has direct implications for more
traditional psychological research and practice. Anti-intersectional or “intersectionality-lite” (Grzanka
& Miles, 2016) perspectives on research within psychology or social justice issues at large limit
understandings of the problem, as well as limit psychologists’ ability to conceive of and implement
effective prevention or intervention strategies.
Huffman et al. (2020) highlight the importance of examining lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)
identity, gender identity, and religious-spiritual identity in understanding emotional well-being and life
satisfaction. In their article, Huffman and colleagues (2020) demonstrate the limitations of a single-axis
framework to capture identity development and mental health in the context of religion and
spirituality among sexual minorities. They found that although religiosity and spirituality were
associated with a negative view of one’s LGB identity, and a negative view of one’s LGB identity was
associated with lower levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction, higher levels of religiosity and
spirituality in and of themselves were not associated with negative self-esteem or negative life
satisfaction for LGB individuals. These findings suggest individuals may experience heterosexism and
sexism not only within society in general but also within some religious communities. Huffman et al.
document the importance of studying both the individual and sociocultural contexts of identity
development when conceptualizing mental health and designing appropriate interventions.

Accordingly, they conclude with intervention strategies at both individual and cultural levels, providing
a helpful framework for taking an intersectional approach to mental health.
Coles and Pasek (2020) revisit the classic psychological concept of intersectional invisibility (PurdieVaughns & Eibach, 2008) in their experimental work on dominant stereotypes and the social–cognitive
erasure of Black women. This study used a stereotypical attribute awareness task and in turn found
that prototypes of Black and White racial groups were constructed in gendered ways that leave Black
women unrecognized as women and underdifferentiated from Black men. Dual exclusion and
underdifferentiation help explain Black women’s simultaneous victimization by the legal system and
neglect when social movements take a single-axis approach to advocacy (e.g., failing to account for
other social identities when advocating for racial justice). The findings from this study buttress
activists’ arguments that the legal system and social justice movements must examine how the social
group prototypes guiding their policies and advocacy might victimize Black women by failing to
recognize their unique gendered racial experiences. By attending to the degree of differentiation
between social groups, Coles and Pasek also point to a new tool for researchers to use when exploring
intersectional issues.
Brassel, Davis, et al. (2020) are not the first to make the case for intersectionality in the study of sexual
harassment (e.g., Kohlman, 2004), but their conceptual piece suggests ways to better understand the
harassment experiences of Black queer women at work. Brassel and colleagues begin from the premise
that workplace sexual harassment is not race- and sexuality-neutral. They then propose that taking an
intersectional approach to the application of “selective incivility” in research can contribute to a
deeper and more expansive understanding of the mechanisms that influence workplace sexual
harassment. This move has the potential to help researchers better estimate the prevalence and
outcomes of workplace sexual harassment by assessing the ways multiple, interlocking systems of
power and oppression influence workplace sexual harassment. They conclude by reminding
researchers that while the incorporation of race and gender into research designs is a key step in
potentially uncovering the complexity of workplace sexual harassment, these are hardly the only
dimensions of difference on which sexual harassment is constituted and asymmetrically experienced at
work.
What does hegemonic masculinity look like in intersectional relief? Brassel, Settles, et al.’s
(2020) contribution to the special issue offers an answer to this question via qualitative examination of
how racial power and privilege shape both Black and White men’s perceptions and experiences of
manhood in the contemporary United States. Brassel and colleagues found that the intersection of
race and gender actually produced different and similar experiences of manhood, once again
reminding psychologists of Cole’s (2009) emphasis on continuities as well as divergences in the study of
intersectional phenomena. For example, they found both Black and White men shared responsibility to
others as a defining aspect of manhood, yet Black and White men were differentiated in the scope of
this responsibility. Black men perceived their responsibility as encompassing their nuclear
and extended family, their neighborhood, and the Black community writ large, whereas White men
perceived their responsibility as limited only to their nuclear families. Both Black and White men
acknowledged male privilege. However, Black men attributed their male privilege to structural forces,
while White men attributed their advantages to individual characteristics of men and women. Further,

White men deflected from acknowledging the structural origins of male privilege by asserting that their
privilege resulted from women’s deficiencies in terms of values and/or abilities. Brassel and colleagues’
study exemplifies the power of intersectionality as a heuristic to explore systems of power and
privilege within unmarked and socially dominant groups. Their research design and subsequent
findings unsettled the default assumption of White men’s masculinity as normative and prototypical.
This process allowed the researchers to name and interrogate how race broadly and Whiteness in
particular shaped participants’ perception and experience of manhood.

Intersectional Psychology in “Revolting Times”

Our issue arrives in a moment of unanticipated, unprecedented crisis. Just as the coronavirus
pandemic is impossible to divorce from the profound social inequalities it has exacerbated, it is
similarly impossible to separate the racial justice uprisings of 2020 from any serious consideration of
intersectionality in the time of COVID-19. Spring 2020 was not the beginning of the Movement for
Black Lives or #BlackLivesMater, but the intersectional movement for racial justice in the United States
reached an apex in the midst of a global pandemic as police officers across the country continued to kill
unarmed African Americans, including (but hardly limited to) George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and
Rayshard Brooks. Protests against White supremacy and systemic racism are ongoing (as of this
writing) around the nation—and across the world—and activists have emphasized the necessity of
intersectional perspectives to recognize the gendered and sexual dimensions of state violence toward
Black women (Crenshaw & Ritchie, 2015). Although the central concerns of intersectionality’s
proponents are not new—social movements built on coalitions, systematic dismantling of oppressive
institutional and organizational structures, recognizing the harm single-axis policies and politics do to
nonprototypical group members, centering the perspectives of multiply marginalized groups—they
now command significant attention in politics, popular culture, and academic research. Just as Collins
(1990/2000) described Black feminist thought as characterized by a dialectic of oppression and
resistance, the injustices and stark social inequalities of the 21st century are met today by sustained,
organized resistance, much of which is being led by young Black women and other women of color
(e.g., Renkl, 2020).
Over the past decade, critical psychologist Michelle Fine (2012, 2016, 2018) has been writing and
speaking about the perils and opportunities of our contemporary moment and the potential roles of
psychologists in what she calls “revolting times.” Using double entendre to denote the realities of
“voracious dispossession” and “virulent white nationalisms” that are both revolting and spark revolt (p.
429), Fine (2018) confronts psychologists and strikes at the core of the discipline’s stated commitment
to the public good (American Psychological Association, 2017): Contribute to justice movements and
social transformation or be complicit in producing science that reproduces inequities. Critically, Fine
frames the question of social justice in psychology not strictly in ethical terms (see also Hammack,
2018). She argues psychologists must be engaged in the rigorous documentation of injustice in the
world, especially “within the psychological canon” (p. 431, emphasis added). This work involves
developing and circulating new frameworks and key constructs alongside activist allies and organizers
whose knowledge is created within the actual diverse communities we claim to serve. Methodological
innovation, ontological critique of tacit disciplinary knowledge, a normative commitment to justice,

and an outward-facing, deeply public science are intertwined principles of Fine’s vision of a psychology
fit for these revolting times.
The articles in this issue reflect an aspiration toward that kind of psychological science that rejects
business as usual and envisions research as a critical, collaborative justice project. The methodological
diversity reflected in these projects is striking. Kilgore et al. (2020); Brassel, Settles, et al. (2020);
and Singh and Bullock (2020) use critical qualitative methods to explore intersectionality in individual
lives and cultural representation. Coles and Pasek (2020), Albuja et al. (2020), and Huffman et al.
(2020) use more traditional psychological tools, including experimentation, to ask intersectionalityinformed questions that advance knowledge of stereotyping, discrimination, and well-being,
particularly for nonprototypical and multiply marginalized populations. Finally, Brassel, Davis, and
colleagues (2020) productively critique a canon of psychological research on sexual harassment in the
interest of centering an often-overlooked population—Black queer women—whose experiences of
workplace harassment are not merely derivative of those of their heterosexual and White
counterparts. Although intersectionality is sometimes lampooned, caricatured, and mischaracterized
as “grievance studies” or possessing a dangerous, nihilistic politics of victimhood (Coaston, 2019), the
work in this issue exemplifies intersectionality’s promise to animate research that is deeply critical,
pragmatic, and constructive. Surely, incorporating intersectionality into psychological science raises
disquieting and sometimes uncomfortable questions about how psychologists do their work, what
values and perspectives the discipline prioritizes, and whom psychologists include and exclude in the
knowledge production process. But as the work featured here evinces, intersectionality is not
antipsychological or antiscientific. To the contrary, intersectionality remains an indispensable tool for
crafting innovative science that seeks, as Hammack (2018) phrased it, “to be of use” in these revolting
times. From that vantage point, the knowledge offered by these articles is actually profoundly
optimistic. In the middle of pandemic, in a time of racial crises, and in an era of political polarization
and overwhelming uncertainty about the future, intersectionality offers psychology a way of thinking
otherwise and imagining justice beyond the limits of the present. It has been our privilege to shepherd
this important work forward.
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